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Abstract: In a recent paper, Colombier (2009) uses a robust estimation technique and 
claims to find empirical evidence that government size has not been detrimental to 
growth  for  OECD  countries  during  the  1970  to  2001  period,  and that  endogenous 
growth theory is not corroborated. We examine the robustness of these findings, and 
show that Colombier’s results differ from those in other recent papers not because of 
the estimator used, but because of the exclusion of other control variables. Adding time 
fixed effects to Colombier’s data set, and using the same econometric method, we 
obtain results in line with other findings, corroborating endogenous growth theory. 
Adding further control variables illustrates the robustness of the negative correlation 
between  total  tax  revenue  and  economic  growth  for  both  instrumented  and  non-
instrumented regressions. 
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This article examines the recent paper by Colombier (2009), which claims that government size has 
not been detrimental to growth for OECD countries in the past, and that endogenous growth theory, 
suggesting  that  distortionary  taxation  decreases  growth,  is  not  corroborated.  For  those  who  have 
followed the debate regarding the relationship between government size and economic growth, the 
paper by Colombier (2009) differs both in the method used and in the results presented.  
Colombier uses a robust modified M-estimator to argue that several other papers have mistakenly 
concluded that the correlation between aggregate government size and annual growth of real GDP per 
capita has been negative since around 1970 among OECD-countries. In the abstract of the article, 
Colombier concludes that aggregate government size has not been detrimental for OECD-countries in 
the past, and in the concluding section, Colombier claims that “[i]n contrast to recent studies, this 
analysis finds a stable positive, albeit small, growth effect of government size.” If Colombier’s finding 
is correct, a number of other recently published studies are wrong. It is therefore of great importance to 
examine why Colombier’s results are the opposite of what other scholars have found. The message 
sent by Colombier is that the more appropriate robust estimator is responsible for the unusual results, 
but there are several other possible explanations in addition to the estimator used: Colombier uses a 
design with moving averages which is not often seen in this type of research, he includes relatively 
few other control variables in his analysis and he refrains from using time fixed effects. 
In this note, we show that Colombier’s results are not driven by the specific econometric technique 
used, but rather driven by the omission of time fixed effects and other control variables. In fact, when 
adding year fixed effects, Colombier’s method and Colombier’s data support the typical conclusion in 
this line of research: a negative and often highly significant correlation between government size and 
growth. 
Related literature 
Colombier is aware that finding a positive correlation between government size and growth is in 
contrast with other studies. He rightly notes that Fölster and Henrekson (2001) and De Avila and 
Strauch (2003) come to the opposite conclusion, but he maintains that “the majority of recent studies 
suggest no growth effects of government size” (p. 910). To support this claim he refers to four studies: 
Kneller et al. (1999), Bassanini et al. (2001), Bleaney et al. (2001) and Agell et al. (2006). 
Colombier’s description of existing literature leaves room for improvement. First of all, the reference 
to Kneller et al. (1999) is misleading. The issue analyzed in this paper is not the correlation between 
aggregate government size and growth, but rather the growth effects of different types of taxes and 
expenditure,  thereby  testing  and  confirming  endogenous  growth  theory.  The  study  finds  that distortionary  taxation  reduces  growth,  whilst  non-distortionary  taxation  does  not,  and  also  that 
productive government expenditure enhances growth, whilst non-productive expenditure does not. The 
paper by Bleaney, et al. (2001) is written by the same authors and analyzes the same questions using 
the same data and reaches the same conclusion. The correlation between aggregate government size 
and growth is not tested in any of these two papers. 
Secondly, the reference to the OECD-working paper by Bassanini et al. (2001) is in some sense more 
appropriate, as this paper actually tests the question at stake. This paper, however, finds a large and 
significant negative correlation between aggregate government size and growth. Commenting on their 
results, the authors write:  
The hypothesis that the size of government has an impact on growth receives some qualified 
support (Table 5). […] The overall tax burden is estimated to have a negative impact on output 
per capita and, controlling for the overall tax burden, there is an additional negative effect 
coming from a tax structure focusing on direct taxes. (p. 28–29) 
Colombier’s fourth and final example is the paper by Agell, et al. (2006), which is a critique of the 
Fölster and Henrekson (2001) paper. Agell et al. argue that the negative correlation found by Fölster 
and Henrekson cannot be given a causal interpretation and that the results are not robust to first 
difference  estimation  and  some  country  exclusions.  In  total,  Colombier  mentions  four  papers  to 
support his proposition that “the majority of recent studies suggest no growth effects of government 
size”. Two of these four papers analyze a different question, and one of the four finds the opposite of 
what Colombier claims. Only the paper by Agell et al. gives some support to Colombier’s view. 
Moreover, a number of papers not mentioned by Colombier have recently examined the correlation 
between growth and government size. In addition to Fölster and Henrekson (2001), papers by Dar and 
AmirKhalkhali (2002), Romero–Avila and Strauch (2008), Bergh and Karlsson (2010) and Afonso 
and Furceri (2010) all find a statistically and economically significant negative correlation between 
aggregate government size and growth in rich countries. The omission of the latter two can of course 
be explained by them being published later, but the main impression is nevertheless that Colombier is 
not fully accurate in his description of existing literature. 
A Robustness test of Colombier’s results 
Colombier states that the aim of his study is two-fold: to analyze growth effects of fiscal policies and 
to show that robust estimation methods are superior to least square estimators in the analysis. This is 
indeed a relevant research question, as it is well-known that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is 
highly sensitive to outliers. The problem arises because OLS minimizes the sum of squared errors, 
which assigns excessive importance to large residuals. In our view, Colombier is right to argue that the results in the literature on the relationship between 
government size and growth should be tested by applying a robust method. Great care has been taken 
in  the  literature  to  examine  the  stability  of  results  to  the  inclusion  of  different  control  variables, 
different countries and time periods, as well as to mitigate potential problems of reversed causality 
between government size and growth. As rightly argued in the article, however, outliers may be a 
serious problem in any econometric study.  
Given that outliers have been detected in the sample (which is a problem in itself), it is not clear-cut 
what to do with them. Removal of outliers work if one can establish that there is an error in the 
making of the observation, but if this is not the case, removal of outliers decreases the dispersion 
present in the data, shrinks the standard errors of estimates and leads to shaky inference. Rather than 
treating outliers in a way that either includes them or assigns them equal weight as to the rest of the 
observations, robust methods present systematic ways of including the atypical observations in the 
regression framework by assigning them less weight in the estimation. 
Formally speaking, the breakdown point of an estimator is the maximum fraction of outliers tolerated 
in a given sample before the estimate is completely flawed (Huber, 1981). OLS has a breakdown point 
of zero. As a remedy, several robust regression methods (methods with breakdown points larger than 
zero) exist, but early methods suffered from low efficiency compared to OLS.
1 The method applied by 
Colombier is the MM-estimator developed in Yohai (1987), which combines a high breakdown point 
(0.5) with high efficiency (in this case 95% of that of ordinary least squares, achieved in the case 
where residuals are Gaussian). The MM-estimator minimizes the residuals scaled by a loss function ρ, 
which is less increasing than the square function for large residuals.
2 
In a panel data analysis, the researcher is generally interested in the most coherent part of the sample. 
One can also expect to find outlier clusters in panel data, representing individual countries or time 
periods. Country- and time period fixed effects in a least squares panel data regression also assess 
these problems by allowing individual intercepts and/or slopes for different countries and time periods, 
but OLS assigns equal weight to all observations when fitting the regression line. Country- and time 
period  fixed  effects  can  also  be  incorporated  in  robust  methods,  but  in  addition  to  allowing  for 
different intercepts the robust methods also scales down the importance of observations which are 
atypical once observable factors are controlled for.  
                                                       
1 For descriptions of robust methods, see Rousseeuw (1984) for the least median of squares, Rousseeuw and Yohai (1984) for 
the S-estimators and Yohai (1987) for MM-estimators. 
2 Formally, the function ρ (.) must be even, non-decreasing in the residuals and less increasing than the square function. 
Residuals are also scaled by a measure of dispersion in order to assure independence with respect to the measurement units of 
the dependent variable. A common choice of ρ is the Tukey's Biweight function.  Colombier’s theoretical basis is an endogenous growth model, where growth in GDP per capita is 
explained  by  the  growth  rate  of  the  labor  force,  the  investment  rate  as  a  share  of  GDP  and  a 
government sector. The government sector is measured as taxes, government revenue and government 
expenditure,  all  in  relation  to  GDP.  No  control  variables  besides  fixed  effects  for  countries  are 
included. 
As mentioned earlier, the robust regression method is not the only new feature in the article. First, the 
estimated model only includes three variables and country fixed effects, which leads to the suspicion 
of omitted variable bias. Second, other papers typically use five year averages of the data, whereas 
Colombier uses a moving average specification. Third, no time-period fixed effects are included in the 
model. This is problematic because growth rates across countries react similarly to common shocks, 
and time period fixed effects are usually included to accommodate this. Given all these differences 
from how the question is usually analyzed in the literature, it is difficult to establish if the new result is 
due to the new estimation technique or due to any of the other differences. 
The MM-estimator is rather computer-intensive, and inclusion of many variables is problematic in this 
respect, but since economic growth is highly sensitive to global trends, the exclusion of time-period 
fixed effects may severely bias the results. Because the method is computationally intensive, we use 
the STATA command mmregress (Vincenzo and Croux, 2009) which requires far less iteration than 
the full MM-estimator. Running a few estimations with all iterations does not change our results, and 
using the faster approach allows us to include time fixed effects as well as to test the robustness of 
Colombier’s results in a number of ways. 
Data 
The estimation is made following the procedure outlined in Colombier’s article and using the same 
dataset. The dataset covers 21 OECD-countries over the period 1970 to 2001, and is collected from the 
OECD Economic Outlook No. 74. To this data we also add data for the share of total population in the 
age group 16–64 years old, also taken from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 74. From the Penn 
World Tables (Heston et al, 2009) we use data for imports and exports (both in relation to GDP), the 
unemployment  rate  and  the  annual  inflation  rate.  During  our  replication,  we  discovered  that  the 
investment  data  is  purified  by  Colombier  before  entering  the  regression,  using  a  procedure  not 
explained in the original article.
3 
                                                       
3 The purifications used by Colombier involves regressing gross investment on the labor force, a set of variables for public 
investment and country dummies. The residual from this regression then enter the growth regression. To discuss and identify possible endogeneity problems, Colombier runs both instrumented and non-
instrumented regressions. Fiscal variables are instrumented by the variable itself lagged five years. The 
most  obvious  problem  of  endogeneity  is  that  social  insurance  schemes  in  welfare  states  act  as 
automatic stabilizers. For this reasons expenditure will be high as a result of lower economic growth. 
In addition to running instrumented regressions, this is often viewed as a reason to put more weight on 
estimates for tax revenue, as the bias here runs in the opposite direction: When growth is high, tax 
revenue  will  be  higher  due  to  progressive  taxes  and  taxes  on  capital  gains.  As  discussed  by  for 
example by Romero–Avila and Strauch (2008), a negative coefficient on taxes therefore provides 
rather strong evidence that high taxes cause lower growth, because reverse causality leads us to expect 
a positive correlation. 
Results 
Having assessed the robustness of Colombier’s results in a number of ways, we have found that the 
non-standard results can be fully explained by Colombier’s limited inclusion of control variables, most 
crucially the omission of time-period fixed effects. In contrast, Colombier’s use of the MM-estimator, 
purification of the investment variable and different ways of calculating the moving averages seem 
unimportant for the results. 
Tables 1a and 1b illustrates the result of adding time fixed effects to the regressions presented by 
Colombier. In both tables, columns 1 and 3 are Colombier’s estimates, and in column 2 and 4 we add 
time fixed effects to the estimation.
4 As can be seen, time fixed effects change the results completely: 
Total government revenue changes from being positive and insignificant to negative and significant. 
The negative coefficient on expenditure becomes more negative. 
 
                                                       
4 In all tables, we report standard errors which are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The derivation of standard 
errors is given in Croux, Dhaene and Hoorelbeke (2008). Table 1a. Adding time period fixed effects to non-instrumented regressions 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
Labor force  0.347**    0.526**    0.381*    0.393** 
  (0.236)    (0.204)    (0.196)    (0.156) 
Investment  0.091***    0.005    0.099***    −0.027 
  (0.033)    (0.024)    (0.035)    (0.027) 
Revenue  0.023    −0.122***         
  (0.025)    (0.025)         
Expenditure          −0.075***    −0.085*** 
          (0.017)    (0.017) 
Constant  1.498*    7.489***    4.036***    7.159*** 





















Notes: Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per capita in PPP. Period: 1970–2001. Columns 1 and 3 are the results 
presented in Colombier (2009), Standard errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 1b. Adding time period fixed effects to instrumented regressions 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
Labor force  0.499**    0.054    0.467**    0.181 
  (0.236)    (0.155)    (0.224)    (0.177) 
Investment  0.057*    −0.057**    0.073**    −0.022 
  (0.033)    (0.027)    (0.034)    (0.033) 
Revenue  0.068***    -0.085***         
  (0.025)    (0.024)         
Expenditure          0.056***    −0.015 
          (0.010)    (0.013) 
Constant  −1.188    6.329***    −1.645**    3.327*** 





















Notes: Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per capita in PPP. Period: 1970-2001. Fiscal variables are instrumented by 
the variable itself lagged 5 years. Columns 1 and 3 are the results presented in Colombier (2009). Standard errors robust to 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   Colombier also examines the growth effects of different types of taxes separately. Table 2 replicates 
these results, adds time fixed effects and also shows the effects of adding additional control variables 
to the analysis. For additional controls, we focus on three of the most commonly included variables, 
namely the unemployment rate, the annual inflation rate and economic openness, the latter measured 
as the sum of imports and exports over GDP. The control variables are not mainly added because we 
are  interested in,  say  the causal  effect  of a  higher unemployment  rate  on the  growth  rate  of  the 
economy, but rather in order to decrease dispersion in the data. Having few variables in the model or 
omitting variables which are highly correlated with the dependent variable increases standard errors 
and give inconsistent estimates. Failure to include important determinants of the dependent variable 
may also create additional outliers. 
Table 2. Adding more variables to the specification: instrumented regressions 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Labor force  0.617***  0.258  0.033  0.019  0.031  0.467**  0.181  −0.223  −0.140  −0.178 
  (0.227)  (0.174)  (0.163)  (0.147)  (0.150)  (0.224)  (0.177)  (0.234)  (0.183)  (0.157) 
Investment  0.107***  −0.007  0.011      0.073**  −0.022  −0.029     
  (0.036)  (0.026)  (0.044)      (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.047)     
Tax goods  0.295***  0.068  −0.114*  −0.114*  −0.188***           
  (0.104)  (0.057)  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.057)           
Tax income  −0.032  −0.072**  −0.094**  −0.092**  −0.079**           
  (0.055)  (0.033)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.036)           
Expenditure            0.056***  −0.015  0.035**  0.032  0.001 
            (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.026)  (0.020) 
Openness      0.080***  0.079***  0.062***      0.065***  0.067***  0.065*** 
      (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.011)      (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Inflation      −0.161***  −0.160***  −0.175***      0.233***  −0.230***  −0.179*** 
      (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.023)      (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.027) 
Unemployment      −0.075**  −0.080**        −0.120***  −0.107***   
      (0.035)  (0.032)        (0.032)  (0.027)   
Constant  0.145  1.980**  1.097  1.425  3.481***  −1.645**  3.327***  0.125  −0.488  0.503 


































Notes: Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per capita in PPP, period: 1970-2001. Columns 1 and 6 are the results presented by 
Colombier (2009). Standard errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Instrumented regressions. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
 
Again, adding year fixed effects is sufficient for most results to look completely standard. The positive 
coefficient on taxes on goods becomes insignificant whereas the coefficient on income taxes turns 
significantly negative. Adding additional controls illustrates the robustness of the latter effect. For 
expenditure, results are less stable and in one case (column 8) a small but significant growth effect of 
public expenditure shows up even with year fixed effects included. Note also that all control variables have the expected sign and are highly significant: Inflation and unemployment correlate negatively 
with growth, while openness is positively correlated with growth. In all, these results are very much in 
line with similar recent studies, such as Bergh and Karlsson (2010).
5  
Finally, we also examine how results change when changing the calculation of moving averages. 
Averages are usually used to mitigate problems of reversed causality as business cycle fluctuations 
may  cause  changes  in  government  expenditure  and  revenue  through  the  working  of  automatic 
stabilizers. Smoothed data should work just as well as data partitioned into five-year periods, which is 
common in the literature. Our replications (not shown) indicate that results are not very sensitive to 
different ways of calculating moving average smoothing of the data. 
Concluding discussion 
Colombier’s central claim is that the robust regression method gives new insights on the relationship 
between government size and growth. While there are good reasons to use a robust estimator, it does 
not seem warranted to argue that it gives new insights. On the contrary, once year fixed effects are 
included, results look very much as expected, given what similar studies have found. 
Regardless of the result, it is interesting to note that Colombier elaborate much on the reasons why 
standard results are seemingly reversed when using a robust estimator. Such a result would mean that 
previous research is flawed due to one or a few outliers, in which case it would be motivated to 
investigate these further. Some outliers should be disregarded due to measurement errors or known 
extraordinary circumstances, while other outliers should properly be included in the sample despite 
being  far  from  other  data  points  in  some  dimensions.  Without  such  additional  clarifications, 
Colombier’s results would likely quickly be forgotten, ignored or dismissed by those who already 
have made up their mind regarding the issue analyzed. Without doubt, many papers which present 
surprising  results have  been  published  without being  cited  very  often,  and as  noted  by  Summers 
(1991), they often use elaborate econometric techniques but still fail to convince. 
In this case, the application of the MM-estimator to the literature on government size and growth 
serves as a robustness test of the literature which has applied least squares techniques. The standard 
result that appear in  several  published  papers  is  confirmed,  leading  to the conclusion that  earlier 
findings of a negative correlation between aggregate government size and growth are not likely to be a 
result of a few influential outliers in the sample. 
                                                       
5 In Bergh and Karlsson (2010), six variables are deemed robust for explaining growth in OECD countries during the 1970–
2005 period: Total tax revenue (−), initial GDP per capita (−), inflation (−), gross savings as a share of GDP (+), labor force 
growth (+) and exports (+). For a survey of recent studies, see Bergh and Henrekson (2011). Finally, it is worth emphasizing that a partial correlation between aggregate government size and 
growth  is  a  finding  with  few  clear  policy  implications.  Politicians  decide  on  specific  taxes  and 
different expenditure projects, all with varying consequences for growth. While many studies for rich 
countries indicate a negative average effect of government size on growth, the question regarding how 
to design tax systems that minimize the negative impact on economic development remain. 
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